New market conditions and "exit strategies" for the German arms industry. OSW Commentary No. 130, 12.03.2014 by Gotkowska, Justyna
1OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 130
www.osw.waw.plCentre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 130 | 12.03.2014
New market conditions and “exit strategies“ 
for the German arms industry
Justyna Gotkowska
Due to changing internal and external conditions, the German arms industry is facing serious 
challenges as are its counterparts across Europe. The arms sales market in Germany is contrac-
ting – orders from the Bundeswehr are slowing down and the Federal Ministry of Defence is 
planning to change the way it cooperates with German arms producers. In addition, member 
states of NATO and the EU, major customers of German arms manufacturers, are reducing 
their defence spending, which will spell a fall in their orders for new armament and military 
equipment. In response to the new circumstances, the German arms industry is beginning to 
organise itself and increase its lobbying efforts in Berlin and, with the support of the federal 
government, it has been implementing specific measures in several areas. German compa-
nies are interested in securing new markets outside NATO and the EU and are also exploring 
opportunities for mergers and joint ventures with other German and foreign companies, and 
are seeking to create more conducive conditions for business on the EU and NATO markets.
The arms industry in Germany
In Germany, the arms industry is defined as 
a part of security and defence industry (Sich-
erheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie)1. It includes 
companies producing for the needs of civil se-
curity and of national defence. It encompasses 
both the production of security systems e.g. for 
public spaces (sports facilities, large-scale public 
events), national borders (e.g. airports and bor-
1 The Federation of German Security and Defence Indus-
tries (BDSV) is the most important source of general 
information on the topic. The BDSV was established in 
2009 to lobby the government, parliament, public opin-
ion and the media on behalf of its members. The group 
has about 50 members, mainly small and medium sized 
companies. Another important lobby (which pre-dates 
the BDSV) is the German Aerospace Industries Associ-
ation (BDLI). The BDLI brings together about 200 firms, 
including many that also supply the arms industry, and 
other industry groups whose members cooperate with 
the defence sector. A number of niche companies, 
whose output is directed at the defence sector, also have 
affiliations with other trade associations. 
der crossings), and critical infrastructure, as well 
as armament and military equipment. By pre-
senting the arms sector as a part of a broader 
branch of industry, the unpopular “arms produc-
tion” in Germany is rhetorically “concealed”, and 
the needs of the German companies supplying 
both the military and the civilian sectors and us-
ing military technologies in civilian production 
and vice versa are addressed. It is worth noting 
that German arms-producing companies are 
privately owned, with the exception of Airbus 
Group (formerly EADS). The German government 
holds a 12% stake in the group and manages its 
shares via the state-controlled KfW bank. The 
federal government has however the right to 
oversee and even veto any transaction in which 
an investor from a third country (outside the EU 
or EFTA) seeks to acquire more than a 25% stake 
in a private German arms company (if it is denot-
ed as being of strategic importance).
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The German arms industry is characterised by 
a high degree of diversity. Among the largest 
arms-producing companies manufacturing 
complete systems are a group of firms included 
in the 2012 SIPRI list of the world’s 100 largest 
arms producers2. These are German subsidiaries 
of two European conglomerates: Airbus Group 
(including Airbus, Airbus Defence & Space, and 
Airbus Helicopters)3 and MBDA (MBDA Deutsch-
land), as well as several German companies: 
Rheinmetall Defence, ThyssenKrupp Marine 
Systems (TKMS), Krauss-Maffei Wegmann 
(KMW) and Diehl Defence. The largest German 
arms-producing companies also include the en-
gine and propulsion systems manufacturers MTU 
Aero Engines and MTU Friedrichshafen, the well-
known firearms manufacturer Heckler & Koch, 
as well as the shipbuilding company Lürssen De-
fence, which narrowly missed out on inclusion 
in the SIPRI list. It is also worth mentioning that 
the arms industry includes small and medi-
um-sized companies that excel in niche military 
technologies (they tend to also operate on the 
civilian market). Such firms include OHB-System 
(design, construction and installation of satel-
lites), Carl Zeiss (optical systems), Rohde-Schwarz 
(electronic test equipment, broadcasting equip-
ment, detection systems), Plath (radioloca-
tion, radio reconnaissance), ESG (information, 
communication and navigation systems), Atlas 
Elektronik (maritime systems and electronics). 
2 SIPRI, The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military 
services companies in the world, 2012, http://www.sipri.
org/research/armaments/production/Top100 
3 Prior to restructuring, that is before 1 January 2014, the 
group was known as EADS; its subsidiaries based in Ger-
many were Cassidian, Eurocopter, Astrium and Airbus 
Operations.
The significance of these firms is evidenced by 
a joint policy on small and medium-sized security 
and defence companies agreed on by a group of 
German trade associations in March 20134. Some 
of Germany’s largest “civilian” companies also 
sell products and technologies to the military. 
Among them are Mercedes Benz (chassis), Daim-
ler (chassis, lorries; a majority shareholder of 
MTU Friedrichshafen), SAP and IBM (software, 
databases), Kärcher (decontamination systems, 
field kitchens) and Siemens (telecommunications 
and IT systems, amongst others)5.
The German arms industry is also characterised 
by a large network of links with foreign com-
panies in NATO and EU member states as well 
as in equivalent countries6. (1) The first group 
includes German subsidiaries of Airbus Group, 
which cooperate closely with Airbus subsidiar-
ies in other EU countries on such joint projects 
as: the Eurofighter, the A400M transport air-
craft, the NH90 medium-size transport helicop-
ter, and the Tiger combat support helicopter. 
This group also includes MBDA Deutschland, 
a subsidiary of the European MBDA group, 
which has been involved in some of the proj-
ects run by its parent company. (2) The sec-
ond group includes German companies (as 
well as German subsidiaries of Airbus Group 
and MBDA Deutschland), which establish joint 
ventures with foreign firms (including Europe-
an, US and Israeli firms) for specific projects7. 
(3) The third group includes companies such as 
4 Konzept zur Mittelstandspolitik – Rahmenbedingungen 
aus Sicht der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungswirtschaft, 
March 2013, http://www.bdsv.eu/de/Taetigkeitsfelder/
Themen/Mittelstand.htm
5 Andreas Seifert, Transformation der Bundeswehr: Transfor-
mation der Rüstungsbranche?, 11 June 2013, http://www.
imi-online.de/2013/06/11/transformation-der-bunde-
swehr-transformation-der-rustungsbranche/
6 Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.
7 Rheinmetall Defence is working with Israel’s IAI in the 
manufacture and servicing of Heron 1 UAVs, leased by 
the Bundeswehr; Diehl Defence has many foreign part-
ners with whom it cooperates in the production of mis-
siles: IRIS-T (with companies in Greece, Italy, Norway, 
Sweden and Spain), RBS15 Mk3 (with Sweden’s SAAB 
Dynamics), Spike LR (with Israel’s Rafael), and the AIM-
9L Sidewinder (with the US Raytheon).
The German arms industry is also char-
acterised by a large network of links with 
foreign companies in NATO and EU mem-
ber states.
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MTU Aero Engines and MTU Friedrichshafen, as 
well as small and medium-sized German firms, 
which supply subsystems for foreign compa-
nies, in Europe and beyond. 
There is little reliable data on the impact of the 
security and defence industry on Germany’s 
economy. According to the BDSV, in 2011 the 
companies in this sector directly employed 
100,000 people and generated another 120,000 
subcontracting jobs. Their output in 2011 was 
worth 21.3 billion euros, or 1% of Germany’s 
GDP. Between 2005 and 2011, the production 
value of the broadly defined industry grew by 
6% – compared to a growth of 0.8% in the 
narrowly defined arms sector. Similarly, em-
ployment figures for the same period showed 
a 5.3% increase for the whole industry, while the 
narrowly defined arms sector recorded a 0.4% 
drop in employment. It should be noted that the 
BDSV has been laying emphasis on the above av-
erage level of innovation among the companies 
(compared to other industries in Germany).
Domestic and foreign markets
The German arms industry offers a wide range of 
cutting-edge military products. Among them 
are complete systems for both ground troops 
(tanks, self-propelled howitzers, infantry com-
bat vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, fire-
arms and ammunition), for the navy (submarines, 
minesweepers, patrol ships, boats, corvettes, 
frigates) and for the air force – under European 
cooperation programmes (combat and transport 
aircraft, helicopters). It also produces a range of 
components and subsystems. In 2007 the Feder-
al Ministry of Defence and Federation of German 
Industries agreed a list of national technolog-
ical and production core capabilities for Ger-
many’s arms industry, which should not be aban-
doned because of their relevance for Germany’s 
security, industrial, technological and armament 
 
policies8. By defining the core capabilities, the 
industry hoped to secure the (financial) backing 
of the federal government, which would in turn 
allow the companies to draft long-term business 
plans. At present, the industrial lobby is calling 
on the federal government to update the above 
mentioned list and to de facto commit itself to 
protecting and supporting the key national capa-
bilities. They argue that the list needs to reflect 
changes in both the Bundeswehr and the arms 
sectors across all NATO and EU member states. 
The Bundeswehr has been the most import-
ant customer of the armament and military 
equipment produced by German companies, 
as seen in the statistics compiled by the BDSV. 
In 2011, just 17% of the defence industry’s out-
put was exported. The ratio of imports to pro-
duction remains very low (3%), which means 
that the needs of the Bundeswehr and of fed-
eral and regional security agencies (police, spe-
cial services) are met mainly by the domestic 
companies. Furthermore, the Bundeswehr has 
financed large-scale research and development 
projects which allow German companies to 
design cutting-edge military equipment. Once 
purchased by the German Armed Forces, the 
8 In 2007, the capabilities (1) in the generation of complete 
systems included: satellite reconnaissance, combat air-
craft, transport aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial ve-
hicles, air defence systems, wheeled armoured vehicles, 
tracked vehicles, future infantry soldier technology (FIST), 
submarines and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV), 
surface warfare vessels, mine countermeasures ves-
sels, model building and simulations, IT systems for the 
Bundeswehr; and (2) regarding subsystems: electronic 
reconnaissance and electronic combat, countermeasures 
against WMD, countermeasures against anti-personnel 
landmines, artillery and improvised explosive devices. 
Bundesverteidigungsministerium and BDI, Gemeinsame 
Erklärung zu Nationalen Wehrtechnischen Kernfähigkeit-
en, 20 November 2007, http://www.bdsv.eu/de/Tae-
tigkeitsfelder/Themen/Technologien.htm 
The industry lobby is at present calling for 
an update to the list of national techno-
logical and production core capabilities.
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equipment is used as a reference product in 
contract negotiations with foreign customers. 
This means that the level of support the federal 
government is likely to offer to German arms 
manufacturers is influenced by the future needs 
of the Bundeswehr. In the short- to mid-term, 
the Bundeswehr will require (reconnaissance 
and armed9) medium-altitude long-endurance 
unmanned aerial vehicles (MALE UAVs), mod-
ernisation of its medium-range air and missile 
defence system, Joint Support Ships, MKS 180 
multi-role combat ships, a successor to the CH-
53 heavy-lift helicopter, and a successor to the 
Transall C-160 tactical transport aircraft. Some 
of the projects are already being implemented 
while others are likely to require technological 
and manufacturing collaboration with foreign 
companies. With regard to future purchases by 
the Bundeswehr, it should be noted that until 
2020 up to 90% of the defence procurement 
budget will be spent on existing large-scale ar-
maments projects (incl. Eurofighter, A400M, 
NH90, Tiger). Consequently, probably no new 
projects of this size will begin before 2020. 
According to federal government figures, since 
2005 Germany has been exporting arms 
worth 1-1.5 billion euros a year. The figures 
show a steady decline over the past three years, 
with the exception of unprecedented sales in 
2010 (worth 2.1 billion euros due to Germany’s 
submarine sales to Portugal and Greece). How-
ever, the actual value of German arms exports 
is difficult to establish because the relevant 
9 Despite objections from the SPD to the purchase of 
armed UAVs, the coalition agreement of the CDU/CSU-
SPD government does not rule out that the UAVs will 
be purchased, but it is expected that the government 
would attach a series of conditions to any such contract.
data published by the federal government is 
incomplete. Although the annual federal gov-
ernment reports contain information about the 
value of arms exports (Kriegswaffen – complete 
systems, firearms, missiles and ammunition), 
they do not specify the value of the export of 
other equipment (Ausrüstungsgüter – parts, 
components, subsystems). However, non-gov-
ernmental sources suggest that the export of 
German electronic and optical products, as well 
as simulators, engines and propulsion systems 
for military purposes is becoming increasingly 
significant. It therefore follows that broadly de-
fined exports of German military products are 
much larger and are not necessarily in decline 
(as the figures for exports of complete military 
systems would have us believe). Interestingly, 
despite a drop in arms exports between 2010 
and 2011 (according to federal government 
data), all major arms manufacturers in Germany 
have reported growth in the sale of armament 
and military equipment (based on figures pub-
lished by SIPRI). There has also been a change 
in the destination of German arms exports. Un-
til recently, 60-75% of German arms (based on 
value) were sold to countries of NATO, the EU 
and equivalent, with the remainder being sold 
to third countries. In 2011, the ratio reversed – 
with just 32% of arms exports heading NATO, 
EU and equivalent markets, and as much as 68% 
being purchased by third countries. This trend 
was observed also in 2012 – 41% and 59%, re-
spectively, which might reflect a new export 
strategy of German arms manufacturers. 
New market conditions and “exit strategies“ 
Due to changing internal and external conditions, 
the traditional German arms industry is current-
ly facing a series of challenges10. Germany’s 
domestic market is contracting and the pro-
curement procedures of the Federal Ministry of 
Defence are under review. This is directly linked 
10 Bearing in mind that we are likely to see a rise in the val-
ue of production directed at the civilian security sector.
The Bundeswehr has so far been the most 
important customer of the armament and 
military equipment produced by German 
companies.
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to a reform of the Bundeswehr currently un-
derway, which is aimed at bringing down the 
number of personnel and thus reducing current 
and future defence procurement. Furthermore, 
the federal government is planning to change 
the way it cooperates with German arms man-
ufacturers (whose main customer it has been). 
The Bundeswehr is expected to cut back on the 
volume of armament and military equipment 
it purchases in the future. It is instead going 
to focus more on “off-the-shelf” products and 
technologies, while new long-term projects are 
likely to be financed less frequently or more ra-
tionally. The members of NATO and the EU 
are reducing their defence spending, which 
is likely to result in fewer orders from the ma-
jor customers of the German arms industry. The 
consequences of the changing circumstances 
could include: a reduction in production lev-
els, redundancies, a loss of capabilities, and 
even the need to redirect output to the civilian 
market. The most acute effect of this will be 
on those companies that produce heavy equip-
ment for ground troops (due to the changing 
needs of armed forces in Western Europe) and 
warships for the navy. Aviation and aerospace 
companies, such as Airbus Group (including its 
German subsidiary), have a greater capacity to 
combine military and civilian production. As 
a result, the German arms industry and the Ger-
man government are working on ‘exit strate-
gies’ to the emerging crisis. Concrete measures 
in several areas have already been taken. 
(1) German arms manufacturers seek to break 
into new markets and to increase their mar-
ket share outside NATO and the EU. In recent 
years, the Federal Security Council11 has ap-
proved arms exports to new markets, some of 
which are highly controversial politically. Those 
11 The Federal Security Council is a federal government 
committee consisting of the Chancellor, the ministers of 
foreign affairs, defence, finance, home affairs, justice, 
as well as the minister of economic and development co-
operation. The council approves large export contracts 
for German arms manufacturers, particularly in the case 
of customers from outside the EU and NATO.
German companies which are expanding their 
activities outside the NATO and EU are being in-
creasingly supported politically, financially and 
through training (Bundeswehr, Bundespolizei) 
by the federal government12. As noted earlier, 
since 2011, the value of German arms exports to 
the “third countries” has exceeded the value of 
exports to the EU and NATO markets. The Gulf 
Arab states – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Ku-
wait, the UAE and Oman – are of growing impor-
tance due to their large defence budgets. They 
are however controversial in the eyes of German 
public opinion because of their authoritarian 
and oppressive governments. For the past few 
years, the growing interest in this region among 
German arms manufacturers has been trans-
formed into tangible results. These included the 
deliveries of self-propelled howitzers and battle 
tanks to Qatar (by KMW); Saudi Arabia’s interest 
in heavy equipment for ground troops (although 
this contract has since fallen through) and, cur-
rently, in submarines and patrol vessels (Lürs-
sen); as well as the contract for the modernisa-
tion of the infrastructure of the Saudi and Qatari 
border control systems (by Airbus Defence and 
Space). Germany’s arms-producing companies 
are also interested in Southeast Asia, as evi-
denced by the recent contracts for the sale of 
12 This last point warrants further analysis. The German min-
istries (of defence and internal affairs) have offered third 
states, customers of German arms manufacturers, train-
ing courses conducted by the Bundeswehr (this is the case 
with Rheinmetall Defence, which supplies technologies 
to a combat training centre in Russia) or by the Bunde-
spolizei (as is the case with Cassidian, which has been 
involved in modernising the infrastructure of the Saudi 
border service). It was meant to make the purchase of 
German armament and military equipment, used also by 
the Bundeswehr and the Bundespolizei, more attractive. 
Due to changing internal and external 
conditions, the traditional German arms 
industry is currently facing a series of 
challenges.
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battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and an-
ti-aircraft systems to Indonesia (Rheinmetall 
Defence) and submarines to Singapore (TKMS). 
Furthermore, some German manufacturers have 
been shifting their attention to the African mar-
kets, including North Africa. Prior to the Arab 
Spring, German firms signed two large contracts 
for the supply of frigates and armoured person-
nel  carriers to Angola (TKMS and Rheinmetall 
Defence); there were also talks about the sale of 
submarines to Egypt (TKMS) but political insta-
bility in this country led to talks being suspend-
ed. According to government data, over the 
past few years Russia has not been a significant 
destination market for German armament and 
military equipment – with exports worth just 
14-40 million euros a year. The value of German 
exports to Russia increased in 2011 to about 
144 million euros (no figures are available for 
2012) due to one large transaction – the sale 
of technologies to a combat training centre for 
Russian Armed Forces (Rheinmetall Defence). 
Nonetheless, Russia until the Ukraine crisis be-
gan was seen as a potential market for German 
arms exports – talks on future projects were held 
by the German and Russian defence ministries 
and arms manufacturers; recent contracts have 
focused mainly on ground troops. Germany has 
stressed that for political reasons it would only 
sell “defence” systems to Russia: training, logis-
tics, supply and medical services. In 2012-2013 
Russia tested the German armoured personnel 
carrier Boxer; it seems however that a deal – or 
future collaboration in this area – is unlikely.
Arms exports to “third countries” are regulat-
ed by federal government policies on the ex-
port of armament and military equipment. Such 
contracts can de jure only be approved in excep-
tional cases if the circumstances and Germany’s 
foreign and defence policy interests permit it. 
De facto, the definition of such circumstances 
leaves the decision to the discretion of the Fed-
eral Security Council. The defence lobby (BDSV) 
is satisfied with the current legal arrangement 
and has only called for faster licencing proce-
dures. In Germany there has been a debate on 
arms export for a while now. Some German pol-
iticians (from the CDU/CSU and the FDP) have 
been arguing about the legal possibilities for 
simplifying the exports. Others (from the SPD 
and the Greens) have called for more restraint 
and greater parliamentary oversight. The current 
CDU/CSU-SPD coalition agreed that the Bunde-
stag must be informed about each new licence 
issued by the Federal Security Council (however, 
this does not apply to preliminary enquiries) and 
the government is obliged to present two re-
ports a year on the export of German arms. Only 
time will tell to what extent the SPD will try to 
use its time in government to change the recent 
trend towards a de facto relaxation of the coun-
try’s arms export policy. It would seem howev-
er that due to the increasingly difficult position 
of the arms industry and the high activity of its 
lobby, the federal government’s support for the 
arms producers will be bolstered. It is worth ex-
amining the proposals of the BDSV because it is 
possible that over time they will be implemented 
– although the government might not wish to 
highlight this fact publicly. The BDSV is calling 
for an interdepartmental strategy that would 
support the arms industry through economic, 
foreign and defence policies. The group also 
wants: a new interdepartmental agency focused 
on supporting export, an institutionalisation of 
the training support offered by the Bundeswehr 
to the customers of German defence products, 
and also faster licensing procedures.
(2) Secondly, German arms companies believe 
that a partial solution to their problems lies in 
mergers and joint ventures with local and in-
ternational companies since these would allow 
them to enter new markets and expand the 
range of products they offer. By doing so they 
One solution for Germany’s arms man-
ufacturers is to break into new markets 
and to increase their market share out-
side NATO and the EU.
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would be able to increase their global compet-
itive advantage. One example of this approach 
is Rheinmetall International Engineering, a 50:50 
joint venture established in October 2013 be-
tween Rheinmetall AG and Germany’s Ferrostaal. 
The JV brings together Rheinmetall Defence and 
Ferrostaal Industrieanlagen GmbH – the lat-
ter company operates in the oil and gas sector, 
mainly in the Middle East and North Africa. The 
JV aims to seek new markets also in Asia and 
in South America. In spring 2013, there were re-
ports suggesting that Krauss-Maffei Wegmann 
was considering a merger with the French arms 
manufacturer Nexter, if the latter is privatised. 
In 2012, the European EADS group (currently 
Airbus Group) pursued a merger with Britain’s 
BAE Systems. It was hoped that the merger 
would improve BAE Systems’ access to European 
markets while EADS would benefit from the US 
and Middle East contacts of the British company. 
The merger fell through mainly due to objections 
from the German government. Berlin argued 
that the merger would marginalise German man-
ufacturers and could threaten the position of 
the largest German developers of land systems 
(Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann) by 
allowing BAE Systems easier access to European 
markets. Since it was forced to abandon the 
merger with BAE Systems, EADS (currently Airbus 
Group) has increasingly focused on the civilian 
market, which now accounts for the bulk of its 
income. It has also announced redundancies in 
the subsidiaries that supply the military sector 
(also in Germany). It is possible that Airbus Group 
will attempt to strengthen its position through 
a merger or asset acquisition in the future13.
13 Following the failed merger, the national stakes in EADS 
(currently Airbus Group) held by France and Germany 
were cut back to 12% each.   
(3) Thirdly, the German arms industry is calling 
for better conditions for business within the 
EU and NATO. They are particularly interested 
in greater transparency in the implementation 
of the European Union’s Defence Package14; the 
standardisation of testing, certification and ap-
proval procedures; the harmonisation of defence 
procurement between EU member states15; and 
the abolition of offsets. Furthermore, it seems 
that the German “enable and enhance” initiative 
within the CSDP also has a business dimension in 
addition to its political dimension. It aims to sup-
port regional partners and enhance regional se-
curity (mainly in Africa) through training and the 
transfer of armament and military equipment. 
Similarly, a business element is visible in some 
of the German initiatives submitted to NATO, 
such as the Framework Nations Concept. This 
initiative seeks to consolidate national arms in-
dustries in clusters led by “framework nations”. 
These nations would retain a broad spectrum of 
capabilities that could be used in EU or NATO op-
erations and they would also retain their arms 
manufacturing capacity at the expense of small-
er partners joining a particular cluster. German 
analysts have suggested that under the Frame-
work Nations Concept, Germany’s arms indus-
try would play an important role across Central, 
and party also Northern, Europe. According to 
some experts, local countries could be given sur-
plus armament and military equipment by the 
Bundeswehr (Eurofighters, NH90 helicopters 
and A400M transport aircraft), while logistics, 
maintenance and repair, and upgrading facilities 
would be located in Germany.
14 The Defence Package consists of two Directives: 2009/43/
EC - abolishing barriers to the transfer of defence prod-
ucts within the EU, and 2009/81/EC - coordinating na-
tional procurement procedures regarding products, ser-
vices and defence-related construction projects.
15 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V., Grund-
satzpapier. Sicherheit für das Industrieland Deutsch-
land, June 2013, http://www.bdi.eu/download_content/
SicherheitUndVerteidigung/32782_BDI_Sicherheit_5.
pdf, p. 18.
The German arms industry is calling for 
better conditions for business within the 
EU and NATO.
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APPENDIX
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52 mln euro
German arms exports (Kriegswaffen) in 1997-201216
Arms exports (Kriegswaffen)17 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Value of arms exports (billion euro) 
[incl. Bundeswehr sales]
- to NATO, EU and equivalent countries
- to third countries 
0.946
[0.003]
1.285
[0.038]
2.119
[0.043]
1.338
[0.131]
1.427
[0.135]
1.510
[0.033]
1.374
n/a
1.629
[0.087]
41%
59%
32%
68%
77%
23%
76%
24%
65%
35%
69%
31%
n/a
n/a
64.2%
35.8%
Share of arms exports 
in Germany’s total exports 
0.09% 0.12% 0.22% 0.17% 0.14% 0.16% 0.15% 0.26%
Value of export licences for arms 
and other equipment  
(Kriegswaffen und Ausrüstungsgüter) 18
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Individual export licences (billion euro) 
- to NATO, EU and equivalent countries
- to third countries
4.704 5.414 4.754 5.043 5.788 3.668 4.189 4.215
45%
55%
57%
43%
71%
29%
51%
49%
45%
55%
66%
34%
72%
28%
61%
39%
Collective export licences (billion euro) 4.17 5.381 0.737 1.996 2.546 5.053 3.496 2.032
16 Source: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Rüstungsexportbericht 2005–2012.
17 Ibidem.
18 The reports specify the value of the licences issued last year for the export both of arms (Kriegswaffen) and equipment 
(Ausrüstungsgüter). The value of the licences usually represents double the value of the actual arms exports (Kriegswaf-
fen). It should be noted that licences are valid for several years and the contracts covered by the licences do not always 
lead to exports.
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APPENDIX
Destinations of Ger-
man arms exports – 
Ranked by value 
2012 
Value (million euro)
2011
Value (million euro)
2010
Value (million euro)
2009
Value (million euro)
1. South Korea 
262.499
Brunei
304.052
Portugal
812.111
Austria
500.396
2. Iraq 
125.603
Singapore
210.772
Greece 
 403.487
South Korea
116.078
3. Poland
79.749
Iraq
159.465
Singapore
169.532
Holand
103.192
4. Italy
58.443
South Korea
75.290
Spain
76.547
Belgium
68.711
5. Singapore
58.114
Turkey
66.989
Belgium
66.511
Spain
50.900
6. USA
47.434
Brazil
49.262
Pakistan
64,952
Pakistan
45.538
7. Spain
43.005
UK
47.762
UK
52.820
UAE
43.252
8. Norway
35.171
Poland
42.361
Brazil
38.548
Greece
 42.821
9. UK
33.307
Canada
40.598
South Korea
37.079
Italy
38.461
10. Ghana
33.307
UAE
33.758
UAE
36.285
UK
35.009
